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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 1988), whereby a defendant in a circuit court 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final judgment and conviction for any crime. In this case, the 
Honorable Paul G. Grant, Judge, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake 
Department in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered 
final judgment and conviction against Richard Menke for Retail 
Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Menke's Motion 
to Suppress evidence illegally seized from his person? 
(a) Did the trial court err in its determination 
that the officers had sufficient reasonable 
suspicion to stop Mr. Menke? 
(b) Did the trial court err in the determination 
that the officers had sufficient probable 
cause to seize and search property in 
Mr. Menke's possession. 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their personsf houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
Utah code Ann. §76-6-602(1)(193) as amended) provides in 
pertinent part: 
A person commits the offense of retail theft 
when he knowingly: (1) takes possession of, 
conceals, carries away, transfers or causes to be 
carried away or transferred, any merchandise 
displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a 
retail mercantile establishment with no 
intention of returning such merchandise or with 
the intention of depriving the merchant 
permanently of the possession , use or benefit of 
such merchandise without paying the retail value 
of such merchandise. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-606 (1953 as amended) provides as 
follows: 
A violation of this chapter shall be punished in accordance 
with section 76-6-412(1) 
Utah Code Ann §76-6-412(1)(c) (1953 as amended) provides in 
pertinent part: 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this 
chapter shall be punishable as follows: 
(c) As a Class A misdemeanor if the value of the property 
stolen was more than $100 but does not exceed $250. 
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Utah Code Ann §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides as 
follows: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his action. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
V. 
RICHARD MENKE, : Case No. 880475-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Retail Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-602(1) (1953 as amended). 
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all evidence taken 
from him at the time of his arrest based on a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (T.3, 106). The 
trial court denied the motion. On October 31, 1988, appellant 
entered a conditional plea of guilty, specifically preserving his 
right to appeal the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress 
(See Addendum "A"). On October 31, 1988, the Honorable Paul G. 
Grant, Judge, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, sentenced Mr. Menke to serve nine 
(9) months in the Salt Lake County Jail and to pay a fine of 
$2,000.00. Execution of the sentence was stayed pending Menke's 
appeal of the trial court's ruling on the Motion to Suppress. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 26, 1988, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Salt Lake 
City Police officers Robert Gilles and Ray Dalling were on patrol in 
downtowm Salt Lake City. (T.6, 7, 8). Officers Gilles and Dalling 
were not, at that time, working in their capacities as Salt Lake 
City Police officers but rather were acting as "control officers" 
for Job Corps, a federal government agency. (T.6, 36). 
The officers were traveling eastbound on 100 South between 
West Temple and Main Streets when Officer Gilles noticed defendant 
removing "property " from underneath his shirt (t.7). ^Menke then 
placed the "property" in an Albertsons grocery bag. Menke was at 
this point 50 - 70 feet away from the officers on the South side of 
the street (t.37) Officer Gilles then commented "Ray, look at that 
guy, he's got some stolen property hefs taking from underneath his 
shirt" (T.8) The officers then mad a U-turn to "check and see what 
was going on" (T.8, 29). As of this point in time there had been no 
reports of crime or theft in the area and no reports that a razor 
had been stolen from Weinstock's (T.15, 37). 
^Testimony at the hearing was unclear as to what Menke 
removed and from where he removed it. Officer Gilles testified that 
Menke removed a grey box from under his shirt (T. 16). Detective 
Dalling stated he saw Menke "remove something from under his shirt" 
(T. 29). Menke testified that he removed a McDonalds sack from 
under a jacket positioned on his shoulder and placed it in an 
Albertsons grocery sack. 
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Gilles instantaneously made certain assumptions regarding 
what he had seen and concluded that Menke was in possession of 
stolen property (T. 8, 18). Gilles parked his vehicle against the 
curb. Officer Dalling exited the vehicle, produced a "flat badge", 
identified himself as an officer and stopped Menke. (T. 38). 
Officer Dalling requested that Menke produce identification. Menke 
produced a wallet with an identification card (T. 8). Both officers 
immediately began to question Menke about the contents of the sack 
(T.8, 15, 30, 39). As stated by Officer Gilles "The thrust of our 
questioning was that our suspicions were such that we were trying to 
determine whether the defendant had a lawful right to be in 
possession of the property that he had" (T.16). Menke appeared 
nervous and did not respond to the officers inquiries (T. 9, 38, 39). 
Shortly after Menke was stopped, officers Gilles and 
Dalling directed Menke to set on a nearby bench where the 
questioning continued. 2Menke was not told that he was free to go 
(T.20). The Albertsons bag and its contents were on the bench at 
Menke's side (T.19). 
^Testimony at the hearing was uncontroverted as to how 
Menke came to be positioned on the bench. Officer Gilles testified 
that the three "moved" from the planter to the bench (T. 15). 
Officer Dalling's testimony was vague as to whether or not Menke was 
directed to sit on the bench(T. 38). Menke testified that the 
officers grasped his elbow and directed him to the bench (T. 68). 
- 3 -
Menke's hand was on the bag (T. 32, 86).3 Officer Gilles squeezed 
the bags and then suggested that the bags contained video tapes (see 
Addendum A). Menke responded affirmatively. Having concluded that 
the bags did not contain video tapes4, Officer Dalling took the bags 
from Menke5 (T.32). Menke did not authorize the officers to take 
the bag or to examine its contents (T.20,89-90). At that point, 
Menke was not free to leave (T. 43). 
Officer Gilles then began questioning Menke as to when 
Menke had purchased the razor. Menke responded that he had 
purchased the razor two weeks prior. (T. 33). Officer Gilles noted 
price tag remnants on the box and left the scene to investigate 
whether any of the retail establishments in the area sold Braun 
Razors (T. 22). Menke and Officer Dalling remained at the scene (T. 
33). Officer Dalling then advised Menke of his Fifth Amendment 
rights (T. 44). Sometime thereafter Officer Gilles returned with a 
female witness from Weinstocks department store (T. 34). The 
witness identified Mr.Menke as an individual she had seen earlier in 
the housewares department (T. 48). It thereafter determined 
^Testimony was in conflict as to the condition of the bag. 
Officer Gilles testified that the bags were partially open exposing 
the contents to view (T. 30). Menke testified that both bags were 
rolled shut and that the contents could not be seen. 
4Officer Dalling testified that he could see the contents 
of the bag and could tell they were not video tapes (T. 32). In his 
police report, however, Officer Dalling stated that he could not 
"identify what was in the sack" See Addendum "A". 
^Testimony was once again in conflict as to who seized 
Menke's bag. Officer Dalling admitted that he took the bag from 
Menke (T. 32). Menke testified that an officer Olsen took the bag. 
(T. 93). 
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that the razor had been stolen. Mr. Menke was at that point 
handcuffed and transported to the jail. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error in denying 
Appellant's Motion to Suppress the evidence seized in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial 
court erred in determining that officers Gilles and Dalling had 
reasonable suspicion to detain and question defendant. Evidence 
produced at trial established not only that the officers lacked 
reasonable suspicion, thus rendering the stop unreasonable at 
inception, it also revealed that the stop was unreasonable in scope. 
The trial court also erred in ruling that the officers had 
probable cause to search two bags carried by Menke. 
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF MR. MENKE AND THE 
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS POSSESSIONS 
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The trial court's denial of Menke's Motion to Suppress 
evidence was based on two findings: (1) that officers Gilles and 
Dalling had sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop, detain and 
question Menke (T. 112); and (2) that Officers Gilles and Dalling 
had sufficient probable cause to justify the seizure of Menke's 
property (T. 113). 
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A. WHEN OFFICERS DALLING AND GILLES STOPPED MR. 
MENKE, A SEIZURE OCCURRED. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App 1987) this 
Court pointed out that the Fourth Amendment "functions to 'prevent 
arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with 
the privacy and personal security of individuals'". (citation 
omitted.) Trujillo, 739 at 87. 
Utah courts have recognized that not all encounters between 
police and citizens amount to "seizures" (see Trujillo, 739 at 87; 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987). Where a "seizure" does 
occur, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment apply. 
In Deitman, the Utah Supreme Court identified three levels 
of interaction between police and citizens: 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any 
time and pose questions so long as the citizen is 
not detained against his will; (2) an officer 
may seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion" that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, 
the "detention must be temporary and last no 
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longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest 
a suspect if the officer has probable cause to 
believe an offense has been committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18 (quoting United States 
v. Merritt, 732 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
This Court in Trujillo stated that "[a] "seizure" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs only when the officer by 
means of physical force or show of authority has in some way 
restricted the liberty of the person." The Court went on to state: 
"[w]hen a reasonable person, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with the 
officer's investigation, but because he believes he is not free to 
leave a seizure occurs." Id, (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 US 594, 554 (1980)) . 
Based on the totality of circumstances existing at the time 
that the officers stopped and questioned Menke, it is clear that 
Menke's "encounter" with Officers Dalling and Gilles was not the 
product of desire to cooperate with police but rather was based on a 
reasonable belief that he was not free to leave. Initially, it is 
evident that officers used a show of authority to detain Menke. 
Testimony from the hearing established that officer Dalling exited a 
police vehicle driven by officer Gilles, approached Menke, ^produced 
a "flat badge and identified himself as an officer (T30). Menke 
stopped immediately (T.38) Officer Gilles joined Dalling and the 
two immediately began to question Menke about the contents of his 
sack (T. 8, 39). Menkefs refusal to respond is indicative of a lack 
of desire to cooperate. Officer Dalling also testified that back-up 
units were summoned and that they responded (T. 45). The actions of 
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the officers in calling a back up officer immediately after arriving 
indicate an intention to detain Menke. 
It is also apparent that the officers employed physical 
force to detain Mr. Menke. Menke testified that the officers 
directed him to a nearby bench by placing one hand on his elbow, one 
hand on his shoulder and ordering him to sit on the bench. (T. 
68). As set forth in footnote 4 Supra the officers testimony does 
not controvert Menke's rendition on this point. In fact, Menkefs 
position is supported by statements made by Officer Dalling on 
cross-examination, as evidenced from the following colloquy: 
Q: How many seconds did you have to observe Mr. Menke: 
A: What do you mean? 
Q: Well, you say that . . . 
A: Once Gilles pointed him out to me . . . 
Q: Yes. 
A: . . I watched him until we got a hold of him. 
Q: So you . . 
A: We made a U-turn, and I watched him until we got him. 
(T. 37 (emphasis added)) 
*>Menke testified that officer Dalling "jumped out of a car 
and come (sic) rushing toward me" (T. 66) 
Menke should not be penalized for the officers failure to 
remember details of the stop and/or failure to controvert Menke's 
rendition of events. The burden is on the State to prove that the 
detention and warrantless search was lawful. See State v. 
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah 1984). The State is, therefore, 
required to establish either that no seizure occurred or that if one 
did, it was valid. Menke's testimony of the events and officer 
Dalling's testimony on cross-examination raises the inference that 
at best officer Dalling used force to detain Menke, and thus 
"seized" him. 
Furthermore, Menke remained with the officers not out of a 
"spirit of cooperation" but rather because he believed he was not 
free to leave. As previously stated, the officers used a show of 
authority to stop Menke. In addition, Officers Dalling and Gilles 
testified that Menke did not answer their questions (T. 9.30). Such 
silence indicates a reluctance to cooperate with the officers. In 
addition, the officers never informed Menke that he was free to 
leave (T 20,45). Menke himself did not feel he was free to leave. 
(T. 69). 
Given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable 
person in the defendants position would believe that he was not free 
to leave, and, therefore, a seizure occurred. The trial court made 
no specific ruling regarding whether or not a "seizure" occurred. 
However, the court ruled that officers had reasonable suspicion 
"sufficient for an officer to stop an individual for questioning" 
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(T. 112). Implicit in such a holding is a finding that Menke was 
"seized". Whether that seizure was lawful is the next point 
addressed by appellant. 
B. THE OFFICERS DETENTION OF MR. MENKE WAS NOT 
BASED ON A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT 
A CRIME HAD BEEN OR WAS ABOUT TO HAVE BEEN 
COMMITTED. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968), the United States 
Supreme Court established a limited exception to the general 
requirement that officers obtain a warrant, based on probable cause, 
for all seizures of persons. The Court recognized that a police 
officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate 
manner approach a person for purposes of investigating the 
possibility of criminal activity even though probable cause to make 
an arrest does not exist, Td. at 22. However, a brief detention, 
without probable cause to arrest, which results in any curtailment 
of that person's liberty by the police must be supported by a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in 
criminal activity. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah adopts language identical to that of the Fourth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution. Utah has codified the Terry requirement 
that detention of a person by the police for investigative purposes 
must be based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Section 
77-7-15 Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended states: 
A police officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
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committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address, and an 
explanation of his actions (emphasis added). 
See also State v. Swanigan, 699 p.2d 718 (Utah 1985). 
In justifying a particular detention, an officer must be 
able to point to specific articulable facts which, when viewed under 
an objective standard, create a reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 
supra; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1988). In addition, any 
detention must be reasonable at its inception and reasonable in 
scope. 
In the case at bar, the officers detention of Mr. Menke was 
not reasonable at inception. The facts relied on by the officers in 
their decision to detain Menke do not give use to a finding of 
reasonable suspicion. 
By all accounts, it was officer Gilles who first noticed 
defendant on First South. Based on what he saw, Gilles concluded 
that Menke had stolen property and commented to officer Dalling, 
"Ray, look at that guy, he's got some stolen property he's taking 
from underneath his shirt" (T. 8). the officers then executed a 
U-turn and stopped Menke. 
Because Gilles had instantaneously decided that the 
property was stolen, his conclusion could have only been based on 
facts made known to him prior to the time he stopped Menke. 
Accordingly, the Court must focus on those facts to determine 
whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Menke. As 
evidenced from the following excerpt, Gilles relied on three factors 
to support his conclusion that the items he saw were stolen: 
First of all, the defendant is standing in front 
of a flower pot on - - just off Main and First 
South, he's removing items from under his 
clothing. Secondly, as he's doing that, he's 
basically (sic) at them to sort of look at what 
they are, and third, he's bagging them in 
non-retail merchandise type sacks". 
(T. 19) 
The foregoing factors, without more, do not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion. Initially, Gilles was approximately 50-70 
feet away from Menke when he first observed him. (T. 37). In 
addition, the vehicle he was operating was moving (T. 37). If 
Officer Gilles testimony is to be believed, it would have been 
impossible for Officer Gilles to have noticed anything other than 
the fact that Menke had "property". (See T. 7 and Addendum A). It 
would have been impossible for him to have made a determination as 
to what the "property" was. Secondly, at that point in time, 
neither officer Gilles or officer Dalling could have made any 
affirmative determination as to where the property came from. There 
had been no reports of crime, no reports of theft, and no reports of 
a shoplift involving a razor from Weinstocks (T. 15, 37). In 
addition, officer Gilles testified that he did not see Menke enter 
or leave the mall (T. 27). 
Officer Gilles1 subjective interpretation of Menke's 
activities led him to believe, instantly, that the "property" was 
stolen. Although the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the 
issue's furtive actions, the question has been the focus of 
significant decision by the Supreme Court of California. In People 
vs. Bower, the California court recognized the inherent problems in 
attempting to infer criminal intent from a furtive action: 
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The difficulty is that from the view point of the 
observer, an innocent gesture can often be 
mistaken for a guilty movement. He must not only 
perceive the gesture accurately, he must also 
interpret it in accordance with the actor's true 
intent. But if words are not infrequently 
ambiguous, gestures are even more so. Many are 
wholly nonspecific, and can be assigned a meaning 
only in their context. Yet the observer may view 
that context quite otherwise from the actor: not 
only is his vantage point different, he may even 
have approached the scene with a preconceived 
notion consciously or subconsciously - of what 
gestures he expected to see and what he expected 
them to mean. The potential for misunderstanding 
in such a situation is obvious. 
597 P.2d 115, 120-121 (Ca. 1979) (quoting People 
v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 478 P.2d 449, 455 (Ca. 
1970) (emphasis in original)). 
The California high court correctly recognized that the 
reasons for movements interpreted by an officer as furtive may run 
the spectrum from wholly legitimate to completely criminal. Because 
of the great possibility of misinterpretation, courts, as well as 
peace officers, must necessarily be exceedingly cautious when basing 
suspicion on gestures of citizens. 
The case at bar presents a situation wherein the 
possibility for misinterpretation was extremely great. There is 
nothing criminal or even suspicious about being on a sidewalk and 
removing "property" from under a shirt and placing it in a bag; 
especially when the officers could have had no idea that the 
property was or where it came from. there are wholly legitimate 
reasons for carrying property in ones clothing: ease of carrying, 
protection from the elements, protection from theft, to name a few. 
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Given the circumstances of the case at bar, such gestures are not 
indicative of criminal activity. For a gesture to be indicative of 
criminal activity it must be unambiguously suspicious. Otherwise, 
ordinary gestures observed in daily life, such as the gesture 
involved in this case, would justify the police detaining and 
questioning law-abiding citizens. 
Menke's detention was also unreasonable in scope. Menke 
testified that one of the officers made several attempts to take the 
bag from him and at one point squeezed the contents of the 
McDonalds sack (T. 71-71). Menke identified this individual as 
officer Olsen and stated that Olson also took the bag away from 
Menke (T. 72). The police report, however, states that officer 
Gilles "had felt the outside of the box and asked Menke if they were 
video tapes in the sack" (See Addendum "A") (T. 41-42). 
While Menke may have been confused as to the identity of 
the officers involved, one thing is clear: the police "squeezed" 
Menke's property prior to actually taking the bags and prior to the 
time they allegedly caught Menke in a lie. Such actions amount to 
an illegal search violative of Menke's Fourth Amendment rights. 
Menke asserts that the officers did not have reasonable 
suspicion to detain him. Absent reasonable suspicion, any 
subsequent search would have be an additional violation of Menke's 
rights. Assuming however, for purposes of argument only, that the 
officers had sufficient cause to detain and question Menke, they 
were not justified in searching Menke's belongings. Terry vs. Ohio 
makes clear that officers investigating an individual whom they 
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reasonably suspect is involved in criminal activity may only conduct 
a pat down search for weapons and may only do so when the officer 
reasonably believes that the person under investigation is armed and 
dangerous. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25. 
The "squeezing" of the bags amounts to a clear violation of 
Mr. Menke's Fourth Amendment rights. It is clear that Menke did not 
in any way authorize officer Gilles to touch or squeeze his 
belongings. Not one of the three officers testified that they 
believed that Menke was armed or dangerous, or that they suspected 
him of carrying a weapon. In addition, the officers did not conduct 
a pat down search of Menke's clothing and body, the only type of 
search authorized by Terry. Further, it is evident from the fact 
and circumstances of this case that the police searched the bag only 
because they thought the bag contained stolen property. The 
officers1 curiosity clearly got the best of them. A violation of 
Menke's constitutional rights followed, thus exceeding the scope of 
a reasonable "Terry" stop. 
C. OFFICERS PALLING AND GILLES LACKED PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO JUSTIFY THE SEARCH OF MENKE'S 
POSSESSIONS. 
The evidence produced at Menke's Suppression hearing 
established that there were two separate and distinct searches of 
Menke's belongings. The first occurred when Officer Gilles 
"squeezed" the contents of the bag (See Addendum "A") (T. 41-42). 
The second search occurred when Officer Dalling took the bag from 
Menke and examined its contents. 
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It is undisputed that the above-mentioned searches were 
conducted without a warrant. Case law dealing with the 
constitutionality of searches and seizures has made clear that 
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless the State can 
demonstrate that the search in question falls clearly within one of 
the carefully defined set of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
(1967); United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 
1986). Based on arguments made at the hearing, it is clear that the 
State was relying on two exceptions to the warrant requirement 
rule: the search incident to arrest exception and the exigent 
circumstances exception (T 100, 107). 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the 
validity of the search incident to arrest exception. See Preston v. 
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 
640 (1983). However, for the exception to apply, there must be an 
arrest and for there to be a valid arrest there must be probable 
cause. "[T]he general rule [is] that every arrest, and every 
seizure having the essential attributes of a formal arrest is 
unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause". 452 U.S. 
692, 700 (1981). Analysis now focuses on whether there was probable 
cause to justify an arrest when officer Gilles squeezed the bag. If 
not, all evidence obtained from that point on would be tainted and 
unadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. 
Prior to the time the officers stopped Menke they observed 
Menke remove an item from his clothing, look at the item briefly 
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and placed the item in a sack. The officers then stopped Menke, 
identified themselves as officer, requested ID from Menke and 
questioned Menke about the contents of the sack. Menke did not 
respond to the officer's inquiries and appeared nervous (T. 45-46). 
Officer Gilles squeezed the bag positioned at Menke's side and asked 
Menke whether the bags contained video tapes (T. 9, 30)(See Addendum 
"A"). Menke responded affirmatively (T. 9, 30). 
Appellant has previously established that the officers 
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and question him. However, 
assuming for purposes of argument only that the officers had 
reasonable suspicion to detain Menke, facts made known to the 
officers immediately following detention and prior to the 
"squeezing" of the bag did not give rise to probable cause. The 
only additional facts evident were Menke's non-responsiveness and 
nervous demeanor. In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 
1987) this court clearly stated that "'nervous1 conduct . . . is 
consistent with innocent as well as criminal behavior"' Id at 89. 
The Court also made clear that an individuals refusal to answer 
questions "does not furnish reasonable grounds for further 
detention". Id at 88 (citation omitted). It is apparent that the 
officers were playing a hunch based on their subjective 
interpretation of Menke's actions and demeanor. Probable cause 
"mean[s] more than bare suspicion" Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160, 175 (1949) and is a more stringent standard than 
reasonable suspicion. Menke's silence and nervous demeanor simply 
can not serve to elevate the officers hunch to probable cause. 
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The foregoing establishes that the initial search or 
"squeezing" of Menke's property was not supported by probable cause 
and therefore was violative of Menke's Fourth Amendment rights. 
Therefore, any evidence obtained as a result of the unconstitutional 
search of the bags is unadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree". 
Officer Gilles testified that Menke responded affirmatively 
when asked whether the bags contained video tapes. However, 
Dalling's police report indicates that this inquiry was the product 
of information gleaned when Gilles squeezed the bags. Menkefs 
affirmation that video tapes were present in the bag was likewise 
the product of the unconstitutional search. Officer Dalling 
testified that he relied on Menke's statement in making his decision 
to take the bag from Menke and examine its contents. In fact, 
Dalling testified that it was the fact that he believed Menke was 
lying in response to Gilles statement that gave him probable cause 
to search the sack (T. 46). Menke's affirmation was clearly the 
product of a Fourth Amendment violation and is unadmissible, see 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963) 
(incriminating statements made by defendant were held 
inadmissible.) The subsequent search of the sack and its contents 
is likewise tainted. 
A second position relied on by the State to justify the 
search of the bags was the exigent circumstances exception (T. 
107). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the 
exigent circumstances exception can come into play in any one of a 
number of scenarios including instances where there is a likelihood 
that delay could result in the loss or destruction of evidence. See 
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Arkansas v, Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,759 (1979). However, for the 
exigent circumstances exception to apply, there must be a finding of 
not only the existence of exigent circumstances, but also a finding 
of probable cause. Neither officer testified that they thought 
Menke was a risk to flee the scene or that he would destroy evidence, 
Again, it is necessary to discuss whether the officers had 
probable cause to justify the search of Menke's bag. Prior analysis 
reveals that they did not. Even if this Court were to find that the 
officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Menke, Menke's silence and 
demeanor were clearly insufficient to elevate reasonable suspicion 
to probable cause. Therefore, inasmuch as the officers lacked 
probable cause, Gilles1 squeezing of Menke's bag violated Menke's 
constitutional rights. Any evidence thereafter obtained, including 
verbal as well as physical evidence, was tainted by the illegal 
search and is inadmissible. 
CONCLUSION 
The State did not meet its burden of establishing that the 
detention of Richard Menke and the subsequent search of his bags and 
their contents were lawful. Therefore, the detention and the 
ensuing search violated Menke's Fourth Amendment rights. All the 
fruits which flowed from the illegal detention and search should be 
suppressed. For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Menke 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and 
remand the case to the trial court with an Order of Dismissal or 
suppression of the illegally seized evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this $$ day of April, 1989. 
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